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Foreword 
This speech, delivered by Richard Manning at the KfW Development Bank, on 28 November 
2007, gives an overview of his experience as Chair of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) over the past 
four years and discusses some of the challenges ahead. It begins with a brief outline of the 
Committee’s history, before important changes of focus that occurred in the mid-1990s. Richard 
Manning is one of the most influential personalities in the field of International Development 
Cooperation. From 2001 to 2003 he chaired the DAC Task Force on Aid Practices, which 
produced a report on “Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery” ahead of the 
High Level Forum in Rome in 2003. In 2005 he was Co-Chair at the Paris High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness. Richard Manning’s reflections on the learning process on the way from Paris 
to the Accra High Level Forum, scheduled for September 2008, are based on his manifold 
practical experiences and help to identify key areas whre more progress towards Aid 
Effectiveness is needed and how to address them. I would like to thank Richard for his decision, 
to publish his personal insights as chair of the DAC as a DIE-Discussion Paper. 
Dirk Messner, Director of the DIE               Bonn, April 2008 
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1 Introduction 
The DAC traces its origin to the Development Assistance Group (DAG), a body of nine 
members, which first came together in Washington on 9 March 1960. The DAG was 
founded as part of a major set of decisions taken by the United States and a few partners in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, as the consequences of the financial problems of major 
Asian countries, on the one hand, and the wave of decolonisation in Africa, Asia and 
elsewhere, on the other, became increasingly apparent. Notably, there was recognition that 
there would be a need for programmes of international aid over many years. The role of 
the DAG within this new architecture was well set out in the mandate agreed for the DAC 
in 1960; it entered into force in 1961, when the newly created OECD became the DAC’s 
home. The key sentence reads, “The Committee will continue to consult on the methods 
for making national resources available for assisting countries and areas in the process of 
economic development and for expanding and improving the flow of long-term funds and 
other development assistance to them.”  
These terms of reference have indeed remained unchanged ever since. 
Aid Volume 
Encouraging a wider sharing of the “burden” of aid was undoubtedly a main reason why 
the United States, as the dominant donor of the day, was so strongly supportive of the 
foundation of the DAG and subsequently the DAC. It also helps to explain why, uniquely 
among OECD Committees, the DAC has had a full-time Chair since its inception, 
provided by the United States right until 1999. Notably, the United States wished to see 
the rapidly emerging economies of the day, such as Germany and Japan, play a larger role 
alongside itself and the more traditional, but also more narrowly focussed “colonial” 
donors such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
This agenda required a clear definition of what should count as aid, so a major thread of 
early DAC work was to define the concept of “Official Development Assistance” (ODA), 
a lengthy process which culminated in the definition, agreed in 1972, that ODA “consists 
of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, 
including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of 
which meets the following test: a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and b) it is 
concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 % (calculated at a 
discount rate of 10 %).” 
It also required transparent reporting of what had actually been committed and spent. This 
gave DAC’s work a strong element of reporting and publishing statistics on aid flows that 
has been central to its mandate ever since. Much time and effort went into using this data 
to encourage “laggards” to increase their aid. And the DAC definition became the de facto 
basis for all international aid targets, notably the 0.7 % of Gross National Product target 
established by the United Nations in 1970 and already achieved by Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Denmark between 1974 and 1978. 
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Aid Quality and Effectiveness 
But the core agenda of the DAC was also, from the start, concerned with the quality and 
effectiveness of aid. 
Quality was seen partly as a necessary complement to the question of volume. Clearly, 
flows at market or near-market terms cannot be seen as equivalent to highly concessional 
loans or outright grants. DAC therefore spent much effort not only on establishing the 
minimum concessionality of ODA, as defined above, but also on devising ways of 
encouraging overall bilateral programmes to be on softer terms. This was done through 
“Recommendations”, the latest of which was agreed in 1978 and still remains in force; it 
requires that the average grant element of each member’s ODA programme should be 
86 %, with higher sub-targets for Least Developed Countries. 
Another aspect of quality was seen as the ability of aid users to get greater value for 
money by being able to buy in any market (“untying”). Detailed discussion on untying aid 
began in the early 1970s; shockingly, it took until 2001 to get a DAC-wide agreement in 
place, and even that covers only financial aid to Least Developed Countries. 
Effectiveness is a wider concept than quality. Right from the start, the Committee was 
involved in the review of its members, first by the Chair (who initially reviewed the entire 
membership each year), and then through a Peer Review process involving the 
membership, which gradually became less frequent but more structured. And much work 
was done on good practice, ranging from the financing of local and recurrent costs to the 
use of technical co-operation. 
In 1982, a working party (now a network) of evaluators was established; it has proved a 
very useful body for lesson learning, establishing common language, standards and 
methodology, and for commissioning joint evaluations. 
Policy Issues 
Finally, over time the DAC developed a role as a platform for the common interests of aid 
agency staff in some key policy areas, such as gender, environment, governance, poverty 
reduction, conflict and the problems of fragile states – a common feature of which is that 
there were no other well-developed networks that brought aid agency policy staff together 
across the membership. For example, in the early 1990s, the DAC did pioneering work in 
bringing issues of governance, participatory development and conflict management into 
the development mainstream, linking together emerging communities of practice among 
its members. 
2 The significance of shaping the twenty-first century and follow up: 
Millennium development goals – harmonisation alignment – policy 
coherence 
In the mid-1990s, the DAC faced something of a crisis. The end of the Cold War had 
given rise to new – and politically very important – programmes of support to the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union. Although the DAC 
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had succeeded in keeping most of these countries separate from the recipients of ODA as 
such, it was evident that ODA levels were declining among many DAC members and that 
aid was an easy programme to cut as OECD members sought to bring their fiscal accounts 
under control. In this unpromising environment, in 1995 the DAC embarked on an 
“Exercise de Réflexion” in which its members asked themselves what the role of 
development co-operation should be in the medium-term. 
The product of this reflection was the landmark document Shaping the Twenty-First 
Century: the Role of Development Co-operation, which launched three parallel strands of 
activity that have proved strategically important not just for DAC itself but for the 
development process worldwide. 
The first, an idea introduced by Japan, was that a limited number of quantitative goals 
should be established for achievement in the medium term, so that development co-
operation would be seen as contributing to real and understandable change in developing 
countries. In discussing this idea, it was quickly agreed that any goals should be drawn, 
insofar as possible, from the sequence of United Nations (UN) sectoral summits which 
had taken place over the previous few years. A proposal, strongly promoted by Germany, 
to include specific reference to considerations of governance and human rights was 
retained, but without any quantitative target. 
The result of this process was the agreement on the International Development Goals, 
which in turn provided the template for the adoption of the Millennium Development 
Goals at the UN General Assembly in 2000. The UN version eliminated references to 
sexual and reproductive health (later restored as a sub-target in 2005) and to governance 
and human rights, while adding a separate Goal which enabled the contribution of rich 
countries to be tracked as part of the process. 
The second strand, which built on DAC work on good practice, was the assertion of 
partnership as a fundamental principle of the relationship between donors and recipient 
countries. This attempted to rebalance relations, moving from the highly conditioned 
donor mindset of the structural adjustment era to recognition of the need for a more 
mature partnership. 
This strand of work led, a few years later, to the setting up of a Task Force to examine 
donor practices with – as a decisive innovation – fifteen developing countries as full 
partners in the discussion. I was Chair of this Task Force, whose work led directly to the 
High Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome in February 2003. 
The third strand comprised a call for “a determined effort to achieve coherence between 
aid policies and other policies that impact on developing countries.” This led, over time, 
to initiatives within the OECD to promote policy coherence for development. 
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3 Key trends in DAC work over the past four years 
I became Chair of the DAC in June 2003. It has been a good time to play this role. 
In the first place, the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (“the Goals”) 
has shown forcibly the power of measuring results. The Goals are far from perfect, and the 
way that they have been interpreted is in some ways unfortunate – for example a 
weakening of interest in infrastructure, now being reversed, and a naïve belief in many 
quarters that Goals established at the global level can be expected to be achieved in the 
same timescale at the regional and country levels, though the ambition to do so is 
praiseworthy. Nevertheless, the Goals have proved very powerful in encouraging the 
poorer developing countries and the donor community to become much more serious 
about what their programmes are really achieving. 
In the second place, the Goals themselves, the success of the campaign against 
unsustainable debt, the impact of migration, and the aftermath of 9/11 have all contributed 
to a much stronger feeling in the minds of both politicians and the wider public in many 
OECD countries that we need not, and should not, accept the present degree of inequality 
between nations, and that high levels of poverty are a security issue as well as a 
humanitarian one. As I put it in the Development Co-operation Report for 2005, we have 
begun to see more of a “joint enterprise” to tackle this key issue. Strong arguments have 
been put forward (e. g. by Jeffery Sachs) about what a greater investment of aid can 
achieve; in some parts of the health sector, where scaling-up of aid has been most marked, 
evident progress can now be seen. At the same time, considerable scepticism has been 
expressed (e. g. by William Easterley and the former Chief Economist of the International 
Monetary Fund [IMF]) as to how far increased aid can really tackle underlying problems 
of growth, poverty and governance. 
This has provided an environment within which the DAC itself has been placed under 
greater pressure to demonstrate results. 
To an important extent, this pressure has been reflected in the work of the Committee 
during my time as Chair in the reassertion of the importance of DAC’s core work on aid 
volume and aid effectiveness. 
Aid Volume 
On aid volume, the move by most DAC (and all European Union [EU]) members to 
quantitative and, above all, time-bound targets for ODA levels has naturally encouraged 
much more attention to issues of the definition of ODA. It is fair to say that many Finance 
Ministries in DAC member countries (and probably many Foreign Ministries) consider the 
existing definition narrow and out of date, notably in relation to the increased costs of 
dealing with state failure and interventions designed to re-establish basic levels of 
security. It is equally true to say that a growing chorus of civil society representatives has 
been no less critical of what is already claimed as ODA, notably the convention of writing 
off at face value commercial debt forgiven by the Paris Club, together with accrued 
interest. 
I believe that a key function of the DAC Chair to hand on to his (or I hope before long her) 
successor an ODA definition that remains credible. When I arrived, I contemplated a root-
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and-branch assessment of the definition under some panel of Wise Persons. I soon 
concluded that this way involved unacceptable risks and little prospect of consensus. I 
therefore adopted a broadly conservative approach, which turned out to be in tune with the 
fact that the views of the membership were quite divided on any radical change. As a 
result, the only changes since 2003 have been: 
• Six clarifications/modifications of what should score as ODA in the interface 
between development and security-related concerns. Experience to date suggests that 
these have resulted in some greater clarity, but with very little increase in actual 
transactions counting as ODA. 
• The addition of Belarus, Libya and Ukraine to the list of ODA recipients at the time 
that we finally stopped reporting flows of “Official Aid” to Russia and to the EU 
Accession countries of Bulgaria and Romania. The inclusion of Belarus and Ukraine 
was particularly welcomed by OECD member states from central Europe. 
• An agreement that transfers under the Clean Development Mechanism could be 
scored as ODA only if the donor did not benefit from the associated carbon credits 
or if any such benefit was deducted from the ODA flow. 
A second matter which has been very significant vis-à-vis the perception of the DAC is 
that we have maintained and indeed improved the transparency of our reporting on ODA. 
In particular, since 2004 we have published a regular “simulation” (not a forecast) of the 
consequences in terms of real disbursements of the public pledges made by most DAC 
members. We also took the step of publishing up front, country-by-country, the amounts 
being delivered as debt relief once these reached (in 2005) a scale that could not be 
ignored in any sensible analysis. Both decisions were contested by some of our members, 
and I should like to put on record my appreciation of the determined and principled 
handling of these pressures by Michael Roeskau, the then Director of the Development 
Co-operation Directorate. In both cases, initial concerns were not repeated, and I believe 
that our readiness to “publish and be damned” was of very considerable value in 
facilitating public debate and in sustaining the credibility of the OECD. 
I do, however, leave with one item of business that I feel that the Committee has been far 
too slow in addressing. This is the continued use of a discount rate of 10 % in calculating 
the 25 % minimum grant element required for a loan to count as ODA. This convention, 
adopted in 1972 as a proxy for the opportunity cost of public investments foregone to 
make funds available for lending, is out of line with the measures used either by OECD 
for its export credit work or by the IMF and the World Bank for considering lending to be 
of a concessional character. In my view the grant element formula is simply indefensible, 
since in present market conditions it is incompatible with the requirement, explicitly stated 
in the ODA definition, that loans must be “concessional in character”. It should therefore 
be a priority to put in place some measure – possibly alongside the existing discount rate – 
that does guarantee that ODA loans are indeed concessional. It is self-evident that we do 
not wish, for example, to encourage lending to poor countries on terms which just meet 
the existing criterion by non-OECD countries – or, I would suggest, by OECD countries 
themselves. 
One thing that struck me immediately on becoming Chair was that, whereas I had access 
to highly detailed figures for how aid had been spent in the past, there were no figures at 
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all for how aid might be spent in the future. Yet clearly, our members must have plans of 
some sort. And clearly, better knowledge of the plans of others could help everyone to 
improve their own decisions on allocating aid. 
So I got the Secretariat to arrange a rather simple survey, the results of which we 
presented to the Senior Level Meeting in 2003. The results were partial, but not entirely 
useless. For example, they suggested a relative rise in Africa’s share of bilateral aid, and 
no disposition to increase the share of multilateral aid in the total – two predictions that 
have so far been well borne out by actual figures. 
Together with the World Bank, we tried a more ambitious survey of future intentions in 
2006. We received usable responses from a majority of DAC members, but these 
accounted for less than a third of DAC aid, because few of the larger donors were willing 
to provide information. The results were, nevertheless, suggestive: Those who responded 
were not, in aggregate, planning to increase aid at the rate that would deliver the 
commitments made by the EU and the G8 in 2005. 
We are conducting a similar survey this year, and will present the results to the Senior 
Level Meeting on 12 December. I expect that this time we shall have enough coverage to 
make much more valuable information available to our members – information that may 
really help decisions on, for example, issues of country concentration. I consider this a 
strategically important development for the DAC. 
Aid Effectiveness 
You cannot justify increasing aid if you do not provide it in efficient and effective ways. 
We all know, as practitioners, that traditional ways of doing business have large costs, for 
both donors and recipients – costs that would, in my opinion, never be tolerated in the 
private sector. I first became involved in this agenda through a concern about the costs, 
particularly to recipients, of a lack of harmonised behaviour by donors: how could one 
develop a sector efficiently in an aid-dependent country if every donor had different 
decision-taking systems, different accountability requirements, different conditions and so 
on? 
As I learned more about the agenda as Chair of the Task Force on Donor Practices, I came 
to realise that harmonisation was only a part of a much wider agenda. By the time of the 
Rome High Level Forum, we had gone some way to integrate the dimension of alignment: 
specifically, aligning aid behind well-considered local strategies, for example those set out 
in Poverty Reduction Strategies. As we moved towards the second High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness in Paris, the agenda broadened, quite correctly, to strengthen the 
developing country dimension further through a more explicit recognition of the 
importance of real ownership of policies by the host country and by inclusion of the 
important principle of mutual accountability. We had already – at Marrakesh in February 
2004 – integrated the critical dimension of managing for results. We thus approached Paris 
with a much more balanced, and in some ways a more political, agenda than at Rome. 
One other aspect was uncomfortably clear. A year or more after the Rome Forum, there 
was depressingly little knowledge of the Rome Declaration at country level, and 
consequently no chance that it was significantly affecting behaviour of donors or host 
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countries in most cases. We had to do better in Paris. Hence the concept of indicators to 
measure the key dimensions of the Paris Declaration, and of targets to be achieved by 
2010. 
One can easily criticise in detail the choice of indicators, and indeed of targets. One may 
regret that we have added one more international monitoring process to the many that 
exist. But what one cannot deny is that recognition of the Paris Declaration is vastly 
higher than of the Rome equivalent, and I believe this is very largely the result of setting 
up monitorable indicators. There is also much evidence that the process has triggered local 
discussion and has encouraged several developing countries to specify their own 
requirements against the core dimensions of aid effectiveness – as for example in 
Vietnam.  
The process owes much to the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, first under Michel 
Reveyrand and now under Jan Cedergren. This body has moved from being a classic 
subsidiary body of the DAC to become a genuinely tripartite (bilateral, multilateral, 
recipient) enterprise, hosted and serviced by the DAC Secretariat. It is a tribute to the 
flexibility of both DAC members and of the wider OECD that this has been possible. 
The DAC and its partners are now well advanced in the preparation of the Third High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, to be held in Accra, 2–4 September 2008. This event 
should be seen as putting more energy into turning the principles agreed in Rome and 
Paris into reality on the ground. It will benefit from the first survey of progress on the 
indicators in the Paris Declaration since the establishment of a 2005 baseline. It will also 
benefit from many strands of work, both under the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 
itself (for example on public financial management and procurement) and outside (for 
example on applying aid effectiveness principles to the work of vertical funds and on 
division of labour among donors). And it will involve developing countries and civil 
society in a more structured and comprehensive way than before. We are looking to the 
Accra Forum not to rewrite the Paris Declaration, but to put in place an “Accra Action 
Agenda” which will identify the key areas where more progress is needed and how to 
address them. 
If the Paris Declaration has been the highest profile attempt in my time as Chair to 
improve the effectiveness of aid, it has been accompanied by two other instruments. 
The first of these is the most traditional of all DAC instruments: Peer Review. I have to 
admit that I came to DAC with a rather unenthusiastic view of Peer Review. In my own 
agency, it had traditionally been regarded as rather a chore, and few changes could be 
attributed to it. 
Over time, my view has changed. I have now seen not a few examples where Peer Review 
has combined with local reform efforts to encourage serious improvements. And many 
experienced agency heads have told me that the process has been valuable, and that over 
time the effect of Peer Review is quite marked. Civil Society organisations and 
Parliaments certainly make considerable use of Peer Review findings in their local 
discussions with the executive. 
The Secretariat deserves credit for gradually systematising and tightening up the review 
process, and I have also seen the value that experienced examiners can bring to the 
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discussions. Indeed, I regard the quality of the examiners as the most significant factor in a 
useful review, after the openness of the country being reviewed. The next Development 
Co-operation Report will highlight twelve lessons for the effective management of 
development agencies that we have taken from the last cycle of reviews. 
The second instrument is the promotion of evidence-based policymaking. This has to do 
with the willingness and the ability of both development agencies and poor countries to be 
clear about the objectives they are pursuing, to monitor and evaluate them effectively, and 
to manage their own institutions in a way that gives incentives for contributing to the 
objectives. This agenda engages several different units within the DAC/OECD family: 
• The DAC-hosted Partnership in Statistics for Development in the Twenty-First 
Century (PARIS21) works to build local statistical capacity, a key underpinning of 
any results-based approach. 
• The Development Centre contributes knowledge and research on aid effectiveness. 
• The Joint Venture on Managing for Development Results (part of the Working Party 
on Aid Effectiveness) encourages learning and good practice in managing for results 
in both developing countries and donor agencies. 
• The DAC’s Evaluation Network promotes good evaluation practice, including a new 
focus on impact evaluation through joint initiatives with UN and Multilateral 
Development Bank evaluation networks, and links to other international initiatives in 
this field. 
• The Informal Network of DAC Development Communicators, supported by the 
Development Centre, concentrates on how to put out messages to the public. 
• During my time as Chair I have seen, and sought consciously to promote, a notable 
increase in the attention being paid to this range of issues. As ODA rises and 
becomes yet more exposed (rightly) to public scrutiny, they will become even more 
important. 
Policy Issues 
The DAC already had a strong set of policy communities when I arrived, and had invested 
a lot of effort in lesson learning and good practice in many areas of development policy. 
Having spent several years supervising the policy division of my own government’s 
bilateral development agency, I was very conscious of the linked problems of over-
production of policy documents, which can become counter-productive, and of lack of 
follow-through of policies at the field level. 
I therefore sought to encourage all the DAC networks working on policy to think less in 
terms of the number of new policy documents produced and more in terms of the impact 
of policy documents on donor behaviour at field level. I was particularly struck by the 
experience of hearing at a meeting on conflict prevention that while the DAC guidelines 
on this subject, which had been issued a few years previously, were considered to be the 
best material of their kind that existed, they were virtually unknown in the field, even in 
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donor offices. This, in turn, reflected the traditional practice of the DAC of leaving 
individual members to conduct (or not) the dissemination of good practices and guidelines 
agreed in the DAC. 
I am pleased with the way that the various policy communities have responded to this 
challenge. For example, when the Fragile States Group drafted a set of “Principles” for 
engagement in situations of fragility, individual members tested the usefulness of these in 
ten developing countries, sparking useful local debate in many cases and resulting in the 
refinement of the draft Principles themselves. It was good to hear the other day that donors 
are using the Principles as a point of reference in, for example, Southern Sudan. 
Another excellent example has been the work to develop, on the basis of a good policy 
paper on Security Sector Reform, approved by the DAC in May 2004, a more operational 
Manual which has been put together as the sort of guide that field staff can carry with 
them and is full of practical examples of how to address common problems. This has very 
clearly helped to trigger more collaboration between development actors and their political 
and defence colleagues. Nonetheless, there is still a lot to do to concentrate DAC’s 
“guidance” work on a few key issues and maximise its prospects of changing donor 
behaviour in practical ways. 
Of course, developing good practice at the field level is not the only purpose of these 
networks. They also have an important role to play in clarifying policy (for example, 
bridging long-standing tensions in order to achieve an agreed DAC statement in April 
2006 on the importance of pro-poor growth) or bringing to the attention of senior 
policymakers the relative failure of policies in some areas (for example, the lack of 
attention to adaptation to climate change in the 2005 publication, Bridge over Troubled 
Waters: Linking climate change and development). And they enable policy communities 
to support and interact with each other across the whole DAC community, as was shown 
by a recent meeting that addressed how to promote crosscutting issues like gender, 
environment and human rights in the context of the Principles of Aid Effectiveness. 
Indeed, recent years have seen a marked resurgence of donor interest in gender equality 
and women’s empowerment as powerful multipliers of development efforts. I hope that 
this means that we are moving beyond high-minded – but ultimately ineffectual – political 
rhetoric toward significantly increased investments and more nuanced approaches to 
empowering women and tackling entrenched gender inequalities.    
Policy Coherence for Development 
Before my arrival as Chair, the OECD had put in place a so-called “horizontal project” on 
promoting more coherent policies by its members which would take account of their 
impact on poorer countries. OECD has both advantages and disadvantages as a home for 
this kind of work. 
A key advantage is, or ought to be, the fact that its secretariat is relatively small and can 
fairly readily get together to ensure that cross-Directorate issues are addressed. The 
downside is that the organisation has traditionally been very “stovepiped”, in other words 
Directorates have very much served Committees of people from the same policy 
community. Progress, therefore, requires some encouragement from the top of the 
Organisation and pressure from members. 
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Over my time as Chair, I have seen a steady increase in the links between DAC and other 
policy communities; this was accelerated following the election of a new Secretary-
General keen to promote cross-Committee work. The transfer of the centre of the work on 
policy coherence for development back to the office of the Secretary-General should help 
to consolidate this. In the future, I would also welcome a more catalytic role by the DAC 
in relation to other Committees. As in my previous experience within my own 
government, creating effective links depends on finding some potential areas of shared 
interest. Policy coherence has to be a “two-way street”. The increasingly outward-looking 
approach of the organisation has certainly assisted the process. 
A few areas worth mention in this connection are: 
• Aid for trade. (see below) 
• Environment. In 2006, the first joint Ministerial meeting between DAC and the 
Environment Policy Committee since 1991 took place. Ministers agreed on a 
Framework for Common Action and a Declaration n Integrating Climate Change 
Adaptation into Development Co-operation, which will guide our joint work until a 
follow-up event in 2009. 
• Agriculture. The Agricultural Directorate devoted its November 2006 Global 
Forum to the topic of the development coherence of OECD agricultural policies. 
• Fisheries. A joint meeting of the Fisheries and Development Assistance Committees 
in April 2007 produced an agreed publication on how to address the incoherence of 
the fisheries policies of many OECD countries towards developing countries. 
• Research into neglected infectious diseases. A joint high level meeting of the 
Science and Technology Committee and the DAC at Noordwijk in May 2007 agreed 
on a Noordwijk Development Agenda designed to promote more research into 
diseases of importance to developing countries for which market forces alone do not 
provide sufficient incentives. 
• Migration. Contributions to the OECD horizontal work on migration are part of the 
policy coherence for development programme – in particular work on the 
development impact of return migration. An experts’ meeting on return migration 
will be held in Italy in early 2008. 
• Anti-corruption. The DAC’s High Level Meeting in 2007 agreed to improve 
coherent approaches to tackling the “supply side” of corruption, notably by better 
enforcement of the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention, ratification of the UN 
Convention by OECD members, and improved Legal assistance on recovery of 
stolen assets. 
• Tax. Work between DAC’s Governance Network and OECD’s Centre for Tax 
Policy on improving support for revenue-raising in poor countries is developing 
well. 
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• Conflict and Fragility. Whole of Government approaches are an integral part of the 
Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, and 
of Security System Reform. 
4 The DAC in the wider world 
One of the most obvious changes in my time as Chair has been in the relationship between 
the DAC and other parts of the international system, which has been driven, above all, by 
the rapidly-changing context in which development co-operation is being supplied. 
The DAC in the OECD 
As with all Committees of the OECD, the DAC has a “sunset clause”, which means that it 
needs a decision by the OECD Council to extend the mandate of the Committee, with 
whatever amendments the Council may see fit to agree, beyond the end of 2008. Ahead of 
this deadline, a formal evaluation of the DAC has just taken place; it will be presented to 
the Council in December 2007. The evaluation of the performance of the Committee 
concludes that with respect to the criterion of Relevance, it is high to very high; with 
respect to Efficiency it is medium; and in Effectiveness and Sustainability, it is high. This 
is, in general, a strikingly positive endorsement of the relevance and impact of the work of 
the DAC and work is already in hand to tackle some of the concerns about efficiency. 
The most significant recommendations of the evaluation are: 
• The DAC should conduct a strategic reflection, in consultation with a wide range of 
stakeholders, on how development assistance needs and constraints are likely to 
evolve over the longer term in the context of the globalisation process, together with 
a fundamental reassessment of its role, structure, functioning and composition in the 
light of the opportunities and risks that are likely to arise. 
• The DAC should strengthen its capacity for top-down direction vis-à-vis its 
subsidiary bodies. 
This means that in the immediate future sufficient top-down guidance needs to be given on 
the draft Programme of Work and Budget for the next OECD biennial planning period of 
2009-2010 (which will start with the Senior Level Meeting in December 2007); it also 
means that before preparation of the work programme from 2011, there will be a need for 
a deeper reflection on the DAC’s comparative advantage. This is a very reasonable 
requirement in the fast-changing world of international resource flows. 
The Committee has had annual “retreats” since 2004, and these have proved excellent 
occasions to look at ways of doing our work more efficiently and with greater impact. One 
of the most important results was the agreement that, from 2006, voluntary contributions 
should be pooled in support of the Programme of Work and Budget agreed on by the 
Council through a limited number of sub-budgets and at predictable times of year. This 
has two very significant advantages. In the first place, it means that DAC members cannot 
use these contributions to promote activities which may be a priority for them or for 
individual units of the Secretariat but not for the Committee as a whole. In the second 
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place, it has reduced the number of financing agreements from 145 in 2004–05 to an 
expected 26 in the current biennium, with a valuable saving of transaction costs. 
DAC members have been sufficiently generous and sufficiently flexible to enable this 
system to work. The work of the Committee is expected to cost EUR 24 million in the 
present biennium, funded virtually 50 : 50 by OECD core funding and voluntary 
contributions, representing a significant rise in the latter from previous levels. Staff 
positions have risen from 68 in 2003 to 94 today (excluding PARIS21), a figure that is 
about the maximum that the present management structure can support. Rigorous 
prioritisation will be needed to prevent an ever-expanding mandate. 
The DAC forms part of the so-called Development Cluster of the OECD. This groups 
DAC with the OECD Development Centre, the Sahel and West African Club, the External 
Relations Committee and the Africa Partnership Forum Support Unit, under the leadership 
of Deputy Secretary-General Mario Amano. The existence of the Cluster facilitates 
coherence and information flow among its constituent bodies. 
The DAC’s key relationship is with the Development Centre, and the OECD Global 
Forum on Development is at the heart of this relationship. This joint venture of the two 
bodies began in 2006 with a three year project to explore and assess the changing 
architecture of development co-operation finance. This is an interesting experiment, which 
has gathered expertise from not just DAC’s members but also from other OECD and non-
OECD governments, multilateral agencies, northern and southern research bodies, and 
other non-State actors in pursuit of better understanding of what some have termed the 
“non-system” of development co-operation. It shows promise, but needs to deliver more 
concrete results as it approaches the end of its initial phase. 
The DAC and the UN 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has long been an observer member 
of the Committee, along with the IMF and the World Bank. It has played a particularly 
significant role, for example, in capacity development and governance questions. But it 
has become even more significant through its dual role as co-ordinator of UN 
development assistance programmes in-country, and its housing of the secretariat of the 
UN Development Group, whose remit also covers the full range of UN Funds and 
Programmes and most of its Specialised Agencies. UNDP/DAC co-operation has been 
very important, not least in delivering on the monitoring of the Paris Declaration 
indicators and in our work on capacity development. 
DAC has a different, but also constructive, relationship with the UN Secretariat, notably 
the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). As the guardians of the UN 
Financing for Development process and the secretariat for the new Economic and Social 
Council  Development Co-operation Forum, UN-DESA has frequently sought information 
and participation from the Secretariat as well as my participation as Chair of the DAC. We 
have done our best to respond positively to such requests, which I see as in the interests of 
better understanding and transparency of development co-operation. The demands on time 
are, however, increasing and will be particularly significant in 2008, with the first full 
meeting of the Development Co-operation Forum in July and various events leading up to 
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the Financing for Development Conference in December. It will be important to build 
constructive relationships between these UN processes and the Accra High Level Forum. 
The DAC and the IFIs, including the Development Committee 
The World Bank, and to a lesser extent the IMF and the Regional Development Banks, has 
been a key partner in much of the work of the DAC and of its subsidiary bodies. Indeed, 
the Evaluation of the DAC takes the Committee to task for having so extensive a 
relationship with the World Bank in comparison to other stakeholders. It is, however, 
difficult to see how the Committee could be fully effective without close links to the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), given their continuing important role in 
development finance and policy, and in addressing issues around global public goods. 
Particularly close relationships exist across the aid effectiveness agenda, where the Bank 
has provided essential support for the process – since the establishment of the Task Force 
on Donor Practices – in the areas of aid allocation, aid architecture, managing for results 
and promotion of better statistics, and policy in fragile situations.  
The Development Committee has provided an opportunity for the DAC, and more recently 
the OECD Secretary-General (I welcome the fact that Angel Gurría has made a point of 
attending and speaking at all meetings since his arrival as Secretary-General), to ensure 
that key elements of our work, notably on aid volume and effectiveness, are understood by 
Finance Ministers from developed and developing countries alike. The transparency of our 
reporting on aid volume has been particularly important in this role. 
The DAC and the WTO 
In 2003, in my first meeting with the then OECD Director for Trade, I was told, very 
politely, that trade was none of my business. As I leave, the DAC and the Trade 
Committee, with excellent co-operation between their Secretariats, have enabled the 
OECD to play an extremely constructive role –in close co-operation with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) –in promoting an international aid-for-trade agenda that goes beyond 
the rhetoric dear to trade negotiators to produce some real impetus for more effective 
collective action to promote competitiveness in poor countries. 
This very positive relationship has developed as a result of long-standing secretariat work 
with WTO to provide a database on aid for trade. As the profile of the issue became higher 
at the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial meeting in December 2005, staff from the 
Development Co-operation Directorate and their Trade and Agriculture colleagues 
provided critical inputs to WTO working parties on the Integrated Framework and, more 
generally, on Aid for Trade. Three results have been the development of broader 
accounting for aid for trade in its various forms, a greater stress on effectiveness and a 
decision not to push for a new Vertical Fund for trade-related projects and programmes. 
The DAC and the G8 
While the DAC has been only at the margins of the G8 process, the OECD has recently 
become much more closely linked; this, in turn, will impact on the DAC. 
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The DAC’s role as the organisation which accounts annually for the ODA of its members 
gave us some closer-than-usual involvement around the time of the Gleneagles Summit in 
2005, when the issue of what the commitments of G8 members and other donors would 
mean for ODA increases arose. I found myself validating, based on the information 
available to us, the G8’s broad assessment that the pledges would add some US$ 50 
billion by 2010 to the USD80 billion ODA level of 2004, in constant prices and exchange 
rates. The Secretariat has continued to update its simulation of the effect of pledges, which 
remains broadly consistent with that simulation. As I have often pointed out, a simulation 
does not mean that DAC members will actually deliver their public pledges, but at least 
no-one will be in any doubt as to whether, in 2010, these pledges were in fact delivered. 
Almost all the requests of the Gleneagles Summit for follow-up on development-related 
issues were addressed to the World Bank. In contrast, the Heiligendamm Summit 
requested OECD to act as a “platform” for most of its planned discussions with the G5of 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. This included the topic of development, 
including issues affecting Africa. A new unit has been established in OECD to handle 
these demands (just as earlier an Africa Partnership Forum Support Unit was established 
to follow up on the dialogue with New Partnership for Africa’s Development). The DAC 
will undoubtedly have to follow these developments closely (see below). 
The DAC and the EU 
With 15 EU Member States and the European Commission in a membership of 23, the 
question of what collective action takes place in Brussels and what in Paris is a live issue. 
As the discussions in the EU have gradually extended beyond European Union-supported 
structures (such as the Cotonou Convention) and the development activities of the 
Commission to matters of general development policy, the issues becomes even more 
significant. The Paris High Level Forum was an interesting example of EU members 
coming to a DAC-hosted event with a clear common position. The EU’s adoption of ODA 
volume targets in 2005, of a statement of development policy in 2006, and of a Code of 
Conduct on Division of Labour in 2007 show the significance of decisions taken in the EU 
for issues at the core of DAC work.  
Where such common approaches exist, the role of the DAC in helping to broker 
agreement with bilateral donors outside the EU becomes important, as was evident at the 
Paris High Level Forum. More frequently, EU co-ordination within the DAC does not 
prevent noticeable differences of view between EU members on a number of topics. 
Nonetheless, the need to remain alert to what is taking place within the EU is evident, and 
the introduction of regular six-monthly meetings with the European Commission has been 
of clear value to both sides. 
The DAC and Non-DAC Donors 
One of the biggest changes during my time as DAC Chair has been the rapid emergence of 
two groups of longstanding donors, each driven by one major actor. 
The first has been the Foundations, notably those of the United States, but also 
increasingly those of Europe and certain other countries. Of course, many foundations 
have been prominent development actors for years (one thinks of Rockefeller and the 
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Green Revolution). But the arrival of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, with a 
programme now building up to a planned US $ 3 billion a year, has radically changed the 
scene. One only has to look at the role Gates has played in establishing the GAVI 
Alliance, in incentivising malaria research, and in stimulating the establishment of the 
Global Fund to see its impact. But its systemic effect goes well beyond health. Look for 
example at the way in which Gates (with Hewlett) have driven the establishment of the 
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation – something that I do not believe the 
collectivity of official evaluation agencies would have seen as a priority. And the Gates 
Foundation is now putting together important proposals for commissioning academic 
research on aid effectiveness.  
The DAC has started to build relations with some of these major Foundations. In addition, 
a meeting in Lisbon last March – as part of the DAC/Development Centre Global Forum 
on Development, and co-sponsored by the European Foundations Centre in Brussels – 
brought together an impressive range of medium-sized foundations; but it also showed 
that most of these run fairly small overseas programmes. These will rise, however, and 
further discussion, on an issue-by-issue basis, may well be useful. 
The second change, of course, has been in the countries outside the DAC. I see four 
concentric circles. The first of these includes the OECD countries that are not yet 
members of DAC, such as Korea, Turkey and the OECD members from central Europe. 
As these countries help finance our budget and attend our meetings, relations are close and 
are becoming increasingly so. Several of the countries concerned are looking to join DAC, 
perhaps around 2010, and this will be very welcome. Several have already developed 
programmes larger than those of quite a few DAC members. We have already carried out 
a light Peer Review of the Czech Republic, and several OECD non-DAC members have 
participated as observers in DAC Peer Reviews. 
Second, there are the EU members who are not yet members of OECD. Of these, Estonia 
and Slovenia have been invited to become members. All these countries have programmes 
which are small but growing rapidly. We look to the Commission to take a lead in helping 
them develop their policies, but are ready to support this by participating in events in an 
efficient way. 
Third, there are the longstanding donors of the Middle East. The DAC used to have 
regular meetings with this group, which at one stage, in the late 1970s, provided over a 
quarter of all ODA. As their contribution declined, so did interest in co-operation. I have 
encouraged closer ties, and the Co-ordination Group of Arab donors invited DAC 
members to an interesting meeting in Kuwait last February. We plan to continue meetings 
on a more focussed basis. 
Last but by no means least, we have the emerging economies, some of whom – such as 
China and India of course – are also longstanding donors. Just as Gates dominates the new 
world of Foundations, China dominates thinking about these donors because of the scale 
of its aid and other capital investments, and the sheer size of its economy. The DAC is 
very keen to develop dialogue with this group, and I have personally visited China, India 
and Thailand to help establish contacts. The so-called BRICS have now attended several 
events organised by DAC and the Development Centre (of which India has been a member 
for some years). We have yet to see the extent of their real interest in dialogue. The 
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Heiligendamm process and other discussions in the run-up to Accra should help define the 
area of mutual interest, which will be at the heart of any productive relationship. 
Key Challenges Ahead 
As I end my time as Chair of the DAC, it may be useful to set out some challenges that I 
leave behind for the Committee under my successor, Eckhard Deutscher. 
The key challenge is to ensure that the Committee genuinely adds value in the rapidly-
changing world of development finance. The new in-depth review with which the 
Committee is tasked as an outcome of the recent evaluation provides the perfect 
opportunity to achieve consensus among the membership on what role it looks to the DAC 
to perform. I would expect this to underscore the value of the DAC’s work on aid volume 
and effectiveness, but with important changes of emphasis. For example: 
• The DAC’s core statistical work needs, as proposed in the evaluation, to be adapted 
to produce more policy-relevant material. This is partly a matter of improving the 
policy-relevance of data supplied by members (a difficult task, given the variety of 
management information systems across DAC members), partly one of applying 
new technology (e. g. text searching), and partly one of the international context 
(Can we get comparable reporting from non-OECD donors, how does the DAC 
system relate to UN initiatives?) 
• The DAC’s aid effectiveness work will, in effect, get an updated mandate from the 
Accra High Level Forum. But beyond that, the future of the High Level Forum 
process itself will need to be re-thought as we approach the next such event, which 
will presumably be convened in 2011 to assess progress against the targets set in the 
Paris Declaration for 2010.  
On the policy side, one major gap at present is the lack of any serious engagement of the 
commercial private sector. This may, of course, simply reflect the view that discussions at 
the DAC-wide level are not useful, or that other venues are seen as more relevant. At the 
least, I see a case for some broader engagement with the growing community of bilateral 
institutions that specialise in financing private sector activity in developing countries, such 
as the European Development Finance Institutions network. 
I see a growing demand from members for more comparable information on the systems 
of their counterparts. The Peer Review Division is about to seek information on levels of 
delegated financial authority. I have had questions from agency heads about DAC 
information on administrative costs, which is at present far from comparable. Some 
networking with the financial and human resource directors of DAC agencies could 
provide better and more comparable information and improve the robustness of the 
analysis in Peer Reviews. 
“Development Diplomacy”, in other words managing relations with the UN, IFIs, Civil 
Society (including Foundations and the academic community) and non-DAC donors, will 
remain an important and time-consuming task for the Chair and for senior managers in the 
Secretariat. 
The DAC as a central actor in development policy issues 
German Development Institute  17 
But at the same time, we have to take seriously the fact that many members feel that the 
DAC is already doing too much, and that the Secretariat’s management capacity is very 
stretched. Whatever new work we take on needs therefore to be balanced by reductions 
elsewhere or by new ways of doing business that reduce pressures on the Secretariat, on 
the Committee and on its members.  
5 Conclusion 
One of my distinguished predecessors, John Lewis, has recently written a very interesting 
book entitled Development Co-operation: an Episode of Sixty Years. It would indeed be 
attractive to think that we are approaching a situation where official aid is no longer 
needed. That is not, however, what I see. Aid from official sources can, should, and will 
decline over time as a proportion of development resources, but it is still needed on a large 
scale to help poorer countries address what the still colossal problems of poverty, 
unemployment, poor health, lack of education and inadequate infrastructure, together with 
environmental challenges of every sort. So we have to get the best value from our 
collective investment. 
The DAC is built on the hypothesis that donors can do better by working together and 
learning together. We need to be practical about this. Donors are independent actors. We 
should not expect uniformity of approach. Diversity, within and beyond the DAC, is 
valuable. But if we are to make a reality of a fairer and less divided world, donors do need 
to work together and to learn together. The DAC needs to adapt, possibly quite radically, 
to the changing world environment. But this need for common learning, common 
reflection and common action will be with us for a good while yet. 
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